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Subject: <nettime> Interview with Kuan-Hsing Chen
From: Geert Lovink <geert@xs4all.nl>
Date: 2 Mar 1998 13:26:24 +0100


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Politics and Cultural Studies in Interasia
Interview with Kuan-Hsing Chen
By Geert Lovink
Taipei, december 20, 1997

Kuan-Hsing Chen is a central figure in the growing network
of political activists and cultural studies academics in
the Asia-Pacific region. I had never met him before,
when he picked me and Toshiya Ueno up at Taipei-airport.
Kuan-Hsing is passionate speaker, a radical critic and
brilliant networker, both in Taiwan and internationally.
And a serious political fighter. Immediately, we dived
into the complex universes of the Tokyo academic left
and discussed its refined forms of non- communication, a
special topic of Kuan-Hsing. He is the organiser of the
first and second cultural studies conference, focussing
on Southern Asia and the Pacific region in 1992 and
1995. A third one will again take place in Taipei, in
may 1998. Kuan-Chen is the editor of scientific journals
and well known for the collection of essays by Stuart
Hall he has been putting together (Stuart Hall--Critical
Dialogues in Cultural Studies, Routledge, 1996). Like
few others, Kuan-Chen has the capability to switch
between theoretical debates and institutional politics
of the global 'cultural studies' tribe, and the
political practices of radical trade unions, gay-lesbian
groups and media activists. A true revolutionary
pragmatist, dedicated to all the actual movements
fighting for social change. He teaches at the Center for
Cultural Studies, National Tsing Hua University in
Hsinchu, not far from Taiwan.He is the author of
"Media/Cultural Criticism: A Popular-Democratic Line of
Fight"(Taipei, 1992) and the co-editor of "Cultural
Studies: the implosion of McDonalds" (Taipei,1992) and
"Trajectories: A New Internationalist Cultural Studies."

GL: Before we discuss media activism, could you tell us
about the general media situation in Taiwan since the
late eighties?

KC: Before the lifting of martial law in 1987, everything
was controlled by the state. It was impossible to get a
publishing license for print, not to mention radio or
television. Right after the lifting, around 1000 new
newspapers registered. The post-war era, with its
accumulation of capital has been producing classes of
people with consuming power. That sort of energy demands
a political democracy, lead by these people. The
so-called democratization process was essentially a
bourgeois democratic form, modelled after the Americans.
Starting from there, the entire society was flowing,
breaking the old bounderies. The political transition
got in place, but in a completely chaotic manner. For
one year there were at least 3000 street demonstrations.
Each newspaper has its own, hidden affiliation with this
or that political party. They cannot affilliate with the
official party line, it has to go in an indirect way. We
used to have the tradition of the literary supplements.
After 1987, cultural criticism emerged in the newspaper
context. At that moment, the conservatives and even the
liberals did not have much to say. The alternative radio
movement started to emerge. But the most influential,
transformative power came from satellites. Suddenly, the
cable people built an infrastructure and in three years,
the number of households with cable jumped from 15 to
70%. The original, state connected television was losing
control. Literary everything became satellized. Now
there are around 100 channels. This means a
redistribution of advertisements, and power. And it did
serve as an alternative to the original power. The
political control decreased, but never completely
dissolved. The entire medialandscape is now commercial.
But from the late eighties to 1995 accumulated a certain
energy which is still moving on.

GL: Internationally, the video activist group 'Green Team'
became well known. What happened to them?

KC: Green Team was no longer effective by 1989. Their moment
was from 1986-88, the peak moment of street
demonstrations. Green Team took the historical moment
and recorded about 1500 tapes, which are still
available. One person is still running it. Later on,
they switched to quick news episodes. The problem with
that is the distribution system. By the early nineties
some of members got really exhausted. There was a
movement of alternative video, which followed the model
of Green Team, trying to establish alternative
distribution points. The former political oppositional
party now has its satellite station. You need hugh
capital. A part of the critical energy could continue,
but at the moment there is no space. There are
alternative radio stattions, but with limited power. In
1995, lots of the intellectual magazines ceased to
exist. The younger generation was not able to emerge,
for various reasons, so the energy died out.

GL: Is the younger generation perhaps more into cosumerism,
which is producing other forms of subculture?

KC: The consolidation of consumer society did not come into
being until the second part of the eighties. The local
culture industry did not start until then. The
accumulation of capital used to be export-oriented. But
suddenly people discovered the internal market. In terms
of music, our generation grew up with the American Top
40. Pop was dominant, not rock and roll. These songs
were distributed via pirated copies. But since the
eighties there is a balance between the Top 40 and the
local music production, or a struggle between them.
Today's students are going to karaoke and nobody sings
in English. It is all in Taiwanese or Mandarin. From
1993 there is a heavy duty Hong Kong influence occuring.
It became hip because of the 1997 hand-over to speak in
a Hong Kong accent. This was a signal of the
stratification of the cultural market. I don't mean to
trash consumer society. A certain form of
commodification will be necessary. Publishing houses
have set up distribution systems and you can walk on it.
From the mid-eigthies that critical generation
accumulated a certain authority and leadership. But
there is indeed a generation gap. From 1994 on there has
been a booming industry of queer writing, by authors who
are still in college or graduate school. This explains
why the gay and lesbian movement is so visible, partly
through commodification. This is a different type of
movement, unlike the late eighties street fighting. The
cultural atmosphere was mediated through commodity
structures. The role of the student movement in all this
is perhaps difficult to understand for outsiders. It
completely died out. You cannot compare it to the
situation in Japan or South-Korea. After June 4, 1989,
here also students took over the Changkai-Chek Memorial
for a week, protesting against the National Assembly.
This ended with a traumatic scene when 50 students'
representatives went into the presidential office. This
cultivated a certain ego, a psychic: that's something
real. The student generation activists moved into the
political arena, with different factions competing
against each other. So that generation is gone. In this
context, it is a bit strange to use the term 'new social
movement'. Before the lifting of martial law, there were
no movements, so everything is new. The younger
generation still has a critical component in it. But it
could not decipher which direction to take, so it is
seemingly less powerfull.

GL: How would you describe the Internet generation? People
seem to use e-mail and there are WWW-adresses being
advertized here and there. But there is no cyber-culture
yet, at least it is not visible.

KC: The commercial Internet is not as big as elsewhere. It
is still largely depending on the academic
infrastructure. Internet is a crystal light of society:
those with more power and resources will have a bigger
space. The lesbian groups are an exception, not the
gays, by the way. The younger generation of feminists
are making an active use of the Net, mainly because of
the commodification of queer identity. These are writers
with cultural capital and names.

GL: In the field of cultural studies, you seem to place
emphasis much more on a better understanding of the
political economy, compared to the focus on popular
culture or the media in general.

KC: This is connected to a personal trajectory. I was
educated in the USA during that booming, initiating
moment of cultural studies. Now I would call this,
within the Ango-American context, an obession with pop
culture. It becomes something playful and fun to study.
Superficial. Simply addressing something called pop
culture becomes a formalistic categorization. It is a
dead end. Nothing critically or politically is happening
there. It is fun to read - that's the end of the story.
But I do not want to deny that. It documents certain
currents of life. I do not want to kick anybody, but I
think that the combination of political economy and
history, in combination with cultural studies, is
absolutely essential. So where is this international
cultural studies supposed to go? Globalization is only a
buzz word. What is the hidden agenda? That is still
unclear. But without these other elements and their
explanatory power, including anthropology, we are losing
the context. Coming home and talking about cultural
studies is kind of weird. We are writing in newspapers
and one could call that cultural criticism. In fact, in
the East-Asian context, cultural studies has a long
literary tradition. You might not agree with their
politics, but that form of writing has its own history.
When I go to Japan you deeply feel that. When you read
the critical cultural essays of Maluyama Masawa... it is
not academic writing, but it is powerful, expressive and
passionate. It is in tune with the social flow and the
political reality. This is a tradition which has to be
reclaimed, or turned into something else. Even if we
agree that the mythical history of cultural studies,
coming from England, is now the dominant current, that
was also growing out of the New Left, in connecting with
the colonial intellectuals. They were deeply connected
to political and social movements. This gets cuts off in
the process of internationalization, specially in the
US. If we do not reconnect now, we will lose our
political energy.

GL: There has been a fascination and urgency from the West
to connect to 'Asia' and its 'emerging markets'. One
could even call it an objective force. After the
businessmen and politicians, the academics, artists and
intellectuals were coming. Should we reject this
fascination, which is gone now anyway because of the
economic/currency crisis?

KC: No. Fascination involves desire and even if you reject
it, it will flow. I understand this objective condition
to link up with this funny thing called 'Asia'. There
has been the phenomena of the triumphalism of the rise
of Asia: we are colonized, we were oppressed and now we
are finally in the center of the universe. Without any
critical reflection on that. This triumphalism is a
result of the resentment policies against imperial power
for the past four centuries. It is very much
understandable. It is a sudden energy, a boom, but also
extremely dangerous. I can understand the anxiety and
fear, that you want to do business, but you do not
understand. In Japan, since the mid-19th century this
process of Europeanization has been going on. Japan
understands far more of Europe then Europe understands
about Japan. So there is nothing wrong with the search
for a new balance, people beginning to understand each
other. But it is very dangerous to call this entire
space 'Asia'. There is no historical, political or even
geographical unity to that. I am rather prefering the
term 'Interasia', which comes from 'Interafrica' or
'Interamerica'. There is a certain unity in East Asia,
unified by Japanese colonialism in the prewar era with
an American dominance after the war. But if you are
situated in East Asia, you do not know anything about
India. We do not even know our neighbour, The
Phillipines. We do not know Korea and Japan. Taipei is
closer to New York and L.A. then to Manilla or Seoul.
That was the effect of the Cold War. The Asianization
process only started after the Cold War came to an end
and is only beginning now.

(thanks to Toshiya Ueno)

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